Language game (philosophy)
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A language-game (German: Sprachspiel) is a philosophical concept developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein, referring to simple examples of language use and the actions into which the language is woven.
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Description[edit]
In his work, Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein regularly referred to the concept of language-games.[1] Wittgenstein rejected the idea that language is somehow separate and corresponding to reality, and he argued that concepts do not need clarity for meaning.[2] Wittgenstein used the term "language-game" to designate forms of language simpler than the entirety of a language itself, "consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven" (PI 7) and connected by family resemblance (Familienähnlichkeit). The concept was intended "to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of life," (PI 23) which gives language its meaning.
The term 'language-game' is used to refer to:
- Fictional examples of language use that are simpler than our own everyday language. (e.g. PI 2)
- Simple uses of language with which children are first taught language (training in language).
- Specific regions of our language with their own grammars and relations to other language-games.
- All of a natural language seen as comprising a family of language-games.
These meanings are not separated from each other by sharp boundaries, but blend into one another (as suggested by the idea of family resemblance). The concept is based on the following analogy: The rules of language are analogous to the rules of games; thus saying something in a language is analogous to making a move in a game. The analogy between a language and a game demonstrates that words have meaning depending on the uses made of them in the various and multiform activities of human life. (The concept is not meant to suggest that there is anything trivial about language, or that language is "just a game".)
Examples[edit]
The classic example of a language-game is the so-called "builder's language" introduced in §2 of the Philosophical Investigations:
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The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building-stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words "block", "pillar" "slab", "beam". A calls them out; — B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. Conceive this as a complete primitive language. (PI 2.)[3] |
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Later "this" and "there" are added (with functions analogous to the function these words have in natural language), and "a, b, c, d" as numerals. An example of its use: builder A says "d — slab — there" and points, and builder B counts four slabs, "a, b, c, d..." and moves them to the place pointed to by A. The builder's language is an activity into which is woven something we would recognize as language, but in a simpler form. This language-game resembles the simple forms of language taught to children, and Wittgenstein asks that we conceive of it as "a complete primitive language" for a tribe of builders.
Postmodernist interpretation[edit]
Jean-François Lyotard explicitly drew upon Wittgenstein's concept of language-games in developing his own notion of metanarratives in The Postmodern Condition. However, Wittgenstein's concept is, from its inception, of a plurality of language games—their plurality is not a feature solely of contemporary discourse. Because Lyotard's discussion is primarily applied in the contexts of authority, power, and legitimation, where Wittgenstein's is broad, and concerned to mark distinctions between a wide range of activities in which language users engage. We can deduce that Lyotard uses the "language-gaminess", which Wittgenstein points out, to direct his own analysis and attention to the ways in which certain language-games, when in service to ideals, tend to form ideas about the world in their navigation in addition to the larger language-gameplay, whereby certain smaller language-games are more likely to play out in conglomerations that reinforce and comment upon the "opinion" side of relationships that are between propositions about the world while also at the risk of denying important, contrary, or non-similar "judgments" if they clash with typical gameplay. In this way, Lyotard implies that algorithms of viable strategies of gameplay, while certainly extant, are seldom used consistently—eventually leading to societal disruption and the realignment of basic language-games with common actions and thoughts.
See also[edit]
References[edit]
- ^ Biletzki, Anat (2009) [2002]. "Ludwig Wittgenstein". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved April 4, 2012.
- ^ Jago 2007, p. 55
- ^ Michael Foord. "Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations - Aphorisms 1-10". Voidspace.org.uk. Retrieved 2013-12-12.
Sources[edit]
- Jago, Mark (2007). Wittgenstein. Humanities-Ebooks.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953). Philosophical Investigations. Blackwell.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1942). Blue and Brown Books. Harper Perennial.
Further reading[edit]
- Nicolas Xanthos (2006), "Wittgenstein's Language Games", in Louis Hébert (dir.), Signo (online), Rimouski (Quebec, Canada)
- Philosophical Investigations
- Language-games and Family Resemblance A description of language-games in the entry for Ludwig Wittgenstein in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Logico-linguistic modeling. This is an application of the language-game concept in the area of information systems and knowledge-based system design.
- Jesús Padilla Gálvez & Margit Gaffal (Eds.) (2013). Forms of Life and Language Games. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2013.[1]
